УДК 93/94

Terrorist act in Budennovsk in 1995 as the most important element of the First Chechen War

Маркарян Константин Валерьевич – магистр Института истории Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета.

Abstract: The article is devoted to the events that are connected with one of the most important events of the First Chechen War — the terrorist act in Budennovsk in 1995. The article presents an analysis of the events that took place, as well as their impact on the course of the First Chechen War.

Аннотация: Статья посвящена событиям, которые связаны с одним из важнейших событий Первой чеченской войны — террористическому акту в Буденновске в 1995 г. В статье представлен анализ произошедших событий, а также их влияние на ход Первой чеченской войны.

Keywords: terrorist attack, Budennovsk, militants, hostages, negotiation.

Ключевые слова: теракт, Буденновск, боевики, заложники, переговоры.

On June 14, 1995, a terrorist act took place in Budyonnovsk, more than 500 people became victims of it. This event was the first major terrorist attack in Russia's recent history. Given that the leaders of the Chechen separatists were the organizers of the attack, the events in Budyonnovsk should be considered in the context of the First Chechen War.

By the summer of 1995, the federal troops were in full control of Grozny and were actively advancing through the mountainous terrain of Chechnya. An extremely unfavorable picture emerged for the Chechen command. Realizing the proximity of defeat, the separatists decided to make a "breakthrough", which was supposed to be carried out by Shamil Basayev's detachment.

Initially, Budyonnovsk was not Basayev's target. Deputy of the State Duma Yu. A. Rybakov in his memoirs pointed out that the goal of the Chechens was the airport of Mineralnye Vody, where the militants were supposed to seize the plane [3]. Basayev himself, in an interview he gave already in Budennovsk, said that Moscow was the main goal, because he believed that this was the only way to stop the war.

There was also an opinion that the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk was planned in advance. This was stated by the former special forces officer K. Nikitin, who claimed that with the help of the Chechen diaspora in Budennovsk, the militants managed to hide huge stocks of weapons in the basement of the city hospital [3]. This version is opposed by a statement by S. Popov, then head of the administration of the Stavropol Territory, who was an eyewitness to the events and personally examined the basement of the hospital. According to him, in the basement "... there was nothing but dust."

Information that Chechen separatists were preparing an attack was received by the Russian special services. Director of the FSB S. V. Stepashin said that there was a lot of information, including false, that a terrorist attack was being prepared in one of the regions of the country. It was because of disinformation that no action was taken to prevent the attack. A. S Kulikov, who at that time headed the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, complained that the federal command did not have enough forces at its disposal to close the entire territory of Chechnya around the perimeter [6, p. 266].

Basayev's detachment, which numbered approximately 200 people, drove in KAMAZ trucks into the territory of the Stavropol Territory from Dagestan. They moved freely, bypassing roadblocks. Free movement was explained by the fact that a man in a police uniform was driving the first car in the convoy, who said that the bodies of soldiers who died in Chechnya were in the cars. At some checkpoints, bribes were used. Basayev himself spoke about this.

Passing through the village of Praskovye, Basayev's trucks, on the orders of N. Lyashenko, head of the Budyonnovsk police department, who received a report on suspicious vehicles, were sent to Budyonnovsk to be checked at the local police department. Having approached the building of the ROVD, the Chechens opened fire. As a result of the ensuing battle, which lasted about 20 minutes, the police managed to repulse the attack of the militants, who managed to move deeper into the city. Moving in cars taken from people, they began to seize hostages, who were taken to the central square of the city. In order to exclude the possibility of an air strike, the militants drove a fuel truck to the square [5, p. 80].

Later, Basayev's people would seize the Budyonnovsky Central District Hospital, to which the hostages were sent from the square in a column. Including another 1,100 patients and hospital staff, a total of about 2,500 people were held hostage, who were barely accommodated on three floors of the hospital.

Having identified representatives of the police and the military by their uniforms, the militants killed six men who were among the hostages. Those militiamen and military who survived, the doctors promptly changed into medical gowns.

On June 14, the Alpha group appeared on the scene. On the night of June 15, the director of the FSS Stepashin, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs V. F. Yerin and the vice-premier and minister for nationalities N. D. Egorov arrived in Budennovsk. The headquarters was located in the building of the local police department. Erin's deputy M.K. Egorov headed the headquarters and conducted negotiations.

As a result of negotiations that began on June 15, Sh. Basayev demanded that journalists be sent to the hospital. Several times the deadline for the appearance of journalists was violated, after which Basayev put forward an ultimatum. Journalists had to appear on time, or every hour he would kill five hostages. Six people were eventually killed. Presumably they were policemen and military personnel [3].

After that, about 20 correspondents were allowed to see Basayev. Several FSB officers passed under the guise of correspondents. After the journalists recorded the interview, Basayev released a small group of women and children.

Negotiations continued with the mediation of Shirvani Basayev, the younger brother of Shamil Basayev. Kulikov delivered the youngest of the Basaevs to Budyonnovsk. After negotiations, Shirvani conveyed his brother's demands: withdrawal of troops from Chechnya, recognition of Chechen independence, and direct negotiations between Yeltsin and Dudayev. The demands of the elder Basayev were rejected [6, p. 281].

By the evening of June 16, the Kovalev Group arrived at the scene: State Duma deputies Yu. A. Rybakov, V. V. Borshchev, M. M. Molostov, A. A. Osovtsov, as well as member of the Federation Council V. V. Kurochkin and human rights activist O. P. Orlov. The group was headed by a State Duma deputy and chairman of the Commission on Human Rights under the President of the Russian Federation S. A. Kovalev. They were asked to join the negotiation process on the morning of June 17, but on the night of June 16-17, the assault began.

The assault began at about 4 o'clock in the morning and ended unsuccessfully. Subdivisions of the Alpha and Vega groups, as well as internal troops, took part in the assault. The militants were ready for the assault, as they listened to the radio broadcast of the security forces through selected police radios. In order to stop the fire, Basayev ordered the hostages to stand up to the windows and wave the sheets, shouting: "Don't shoot."

The special forces managed to get the hostages out of traumatology, but the bulk of them remained in the main building, which they could not reach. The use of grenade launchers led to a fire in the hospital building, which the hostages managed to extinguish. About 100 people were injured in the assault, 30 people died. Mostly they were hostages.

After the assault ended, the militants offered to release the pregnant women and children in exchange for stopping the assault. For negotiations, doctors V. Chepurin and P. Kostyushenko were sent to the headquarters, who went under the flag of the Red Cross. Having met deputy Rybakov, they talked at the headquarters with the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Erin, who said that the federal command did not intentionally abandon the assault [3].

Having received a refusal from Erin, the Kovalev Group contacted the former Prime Minister E. T. Gaidar, who called the current Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin, who had the final decision, since the President of the Russian Federation B. N. Yeltsin at that time was in Canada at the G7 summit.

Chernomyrdin instructed Kovalev to negotiate with Basayev on behalf of the Russian government. On the morning of June 18, the negotiation process began, and by 10:45 a.m., it was possible to agree on the delivery of food for the hostages. After that, Basayev was asked to release the women and children in exchange for a group of deputies. Basayev agreed, but on the condition that he first spoke with Chernomyrdin. It was then that the famous telephone conversation between Basayev and Chernomyrdin took place, which was broadcast on television. After the conversation, an agreement was signed to end the war and resolve the issue of the status of Chechnya by peaceful means. Subsequently, this agreement will be violated [7].

After signing the agreement, Basayev released the women and children in exchange for deputies. Chernomyrdin ordered FSB director Stepashin to provide buses to Basayev's detachment. Stepashin would later claim that the FSB planned to mine the buses, but did not succeed due to lack of time. In total, it took 7 buses and a refrigerator truck, in which the militants, the bodies of the dead militants and volunteers fit, who, as hostages, were supposed to accompany the militants to the safe areas of Chechnya. This was the demand of Basayev, who thereby wanted to secure his detachment.

There were 139 volunteers in total. Among the volunteers were deputies of the Kovalev Group, representatives of the administrations of Budennovsk and the Stavropol Territory, as well as 12 journalists. The group of volunteers was mostly men, but there was also one woman.

The militants moved out of Budyonnovsk on June 19. By June 21, they arrived on the territory of Chechnya, after which the remaining hostages were released. According to Rybakov, saying goodbye to the hostages, Basayev said: “I treated you like a dog. But I had to save my people!”

The political consequences of the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk followed immediately. So, on June 30, 1995, the following were dismissed: Deputy Prime Minister Egorov, Director of the FSB Stepashin, Interior Minister Erin and Governor of the Stavropol Territory E. S. Kuznetsov [1, l. 1–4]. Also, the events in Budennovsk prompted the authorities to adopt on July 25, 1998 the law "On Combating Terrorism" [2, l. 1–2]. According to this law, it was forbidden to satisfy the political demands of terrorists. June 22, 1995 was declared a day of mourning in Russia [4].

Disputes about how the events in Budyonnovsk influenced the course of the First Chechen War are still ongoing. According to General G. N. Troshev, the negotiation process, which was initiated by the Kremlin, was beneficial to representatives of the Chechen separatists, who needed to get a breather to continue the war. In addition, the impunity with which the militants managed to commit a terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk will in the future lead to the fact that terrorist acts will be used by Chechen separatists to wage war [8, p. 33].

Today, most representatives of law enforcement agencies and prominent military figures agree that if Sh. Basayev had been killed during the storming of the Budyonnovsk hospital, the war would have ended earlier and with a different outcome. The human rights community, on the contrary, believes that the events in Budyonnovsk should be viewed from a positive point of view, since most of the hostages were saved.

References

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  2. Presidential Center B. N. Yeltsin. F. 8. Op. 1. D. 5. Decrees of the President of Russia (1995). 4 l.
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